13. Preparing a shadow ministerial team for office: Lessons from 1997 and 2010
Summary
In the UK the main party of government has changed only twice in three decades. In 1997, Labour took over after 18 years of Conservative rule; in 2010, after 13 years of Labour, the Conservatives again became the largest party, entering a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. The next general election, expected in 2024, will mark 14 years of Conservative or Conservative-led government; current opinion polls suggest government may change hands again.
The Institute for Government is undertaking research in preparation for the expected 2024 election and all its potential outcomes, including looking at how the opposition and the civil service should prepare for a possible transition of government.
Among the many competing demands on any leader of the opposition is to create a strong shadow ministerial team capable of an effective transition – and then, crucially, of effective government. The timing of any reshuffles to achieve this aim is important. This Insight looks at the pattern of reshuffles around the 1997 and 2010 elections, the ministerial and shadow experience of those eventually appointed in those new governments, and what impact this had on their work as ministers.
Drawing on the Institute for Government’s data analysis, reports and Ministers Reflect archive, we identify lessons for how Sir Keir Starmer should approach building his shadow ministerial team before a 2024 general election. In particular, we look at how Starmer should time and approach a potential reshuffle, now mooted to take place in the autumn, to increase the effectiveness of his shadow team if they enter government.
The Institute for Government has published several reports showing that ministerial churn is detrimental to government effectiveness. It:
hinders effective policy making
prevents long-term thinking
undermines relationships ministers have worked hard to establish
inhibits parliamentary scrutiny
can mean government resources must be redirected with little notice.1
Many of these problems apply in opposition, too. Relationships with other shadows and with outside actors are disrupted by shadow ministerial turnover, as, crucially, is opposition policy development. Unlike ministerial experience, which cannot be developed in opposition, amassing policy making experience is valuable. Shadow ministers will find they are at an advantage if they enter government with a well-developed plan, for the brief they are given.
There are some good reasons for moving shadow ministers close to elections, as well as in the government formation process. Political parties are focused first and foremost on winning general elections, and this requires different skills to running a department. There are always cases where reshuffles may be required to reward loyalty, or promote a potential rising star. Shadow ministerial teams may also require a fresh set of eyes in a policy area that isn’t working, to improve difficult relationships between shadow ministers, or simply to replace poor performers. New governments are never exact facsimiles of the shadow frontbench. But just as effective government is damaged by churn, opposition party leaders should also aim to keep such moves to a minimum.
